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Abstract 
 
EP committees have become a key element in the EU policy-making process and can be 
seen as a vital contribution to the shaping of legislation: Westlake (1994, p. 191) 
effectively described them as the “legislative backbone” of the EP. Although committees 
play such an important role within the EP until the mid 1990s they rarely were at the 
focus of academic attention. More recently some studies have tried to shed some light on 
these fora in order to explain how they contribute to the functioning of the EP as a whole 
(Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; McElroy 2001; Whitaker 2005; Hix and Noury and 
Roland 2005).  
 
What however can be seen as a lacuna in EP committee research is the examination of the 
question of how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are socialized into EP 
committees and whether this process has an impact on the decision-making process 
within the EP, for example has an effect on consensus formation in any way. 
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1. Introduction 
 
European Parliament (EP) committees have unsurprisingly attracted increasing attention 
in recent years: their revaluation went hand in hand with the fast acquisition of new 
powers by the EP (from consultative assembly to co-legislator in the mid-1990s). They 
have become a key element in the EU policy-making process and are today seen as a vital 
contribution to the shaping of legislation, effectively pictured as ‘legislative backbone’ of 
the EP (Westlake 1994, p. 191). Several new studies shed light on these fora, particularly 
paying attention to appointments to committees, selection of committee chairs and 
distribution of reports within the committees (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; McElroy 
2001; Whitaker 2005), while others describe in great detail their prerogatives and duties 
(for example, Corbett et al. 2005).  Others point towards the consensual nature of the EP 
in general (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007) and that of EP committees more in particular, 
where rapporteurs are seen as key and are coined as being ‘legislative entrepreneurs’  
(Bendetto 2005). 
 
What however can be seen as somewhat as a lacuna in EP committee research is the 
question how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are socialised into EP 
committees. For the purpose of this paper socialisation will be defined as a process by 
way of which ‘individuals are transformed from organizational outsiders to participating 
and effective members’.  (Feldmann 1976, p. 309 quoted in: Pomorska and Szcezepanik 
2006, p. 2).  In the context of EP committees “effectivity”, which is as is well known 
very difficult to assess, will be seen as the ability to adopt an consensual stance in order 
for the dossier to be passed within committee and possibly also through plenary.  Closely 
linked is the question whether we can see something such as ‘espirit de corps’ developing 
within committees. One has to note that this term, although widely used
1, is not precisely 
defined. Within this paper the definition developed by Chris Shore for the Commission 
will be adapted. Shore defines ‘esprit de corps’ as a ‘sense of belonging’ to the institution 
(Shore 2002). This definition will be modified for EP committees, where ‘espirit de 
                                                 
1 For example in a draft ‘Decision of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of 
Justice, the Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the 
Regions and the European Ombudsman of setting up a European Administrative School (2003/.../EC)” the 
spread of common values and the creation of an esprit de corps throughout the institutions of the Union is 
advocated. 
 
  3corps’ will not only be seen as a sense of belonging but also as adopting a set of similar 
not to say common values.    
 
This paper departs from a quantitative data analysis
2 in order to see whether whether the 
assumption that committees are consensual arenas is actually founded. Based on these 
initial observations, case studies will be conducted by examining the process adhered to 
when adopting (controversial) directives in selected committees: the Port Services 
Directive
3 and the Bolkestein Directive.
4 The three committees under scrutiny in this 
context are the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the Committee 
Transport and Tourism (TRAN) and IMCO (Internal Market and Consumer Protection).
5 
The aim of the case studies is to examine mechanisms that contribute to consensus 
formation and as such to be able to come up with some initial observations as regards to 
possible factors that might have a socializing effect on MEPs within EP committees.  
 
In this quest the paper will be structured as follows: in a first parts the question of 
committees as consensual arenas will be examined and some of the literature on 
committees will be reviewed. This will be used as a basis for examining the question of 
socialization into EP committees and as a basis for the case studies. The paper will close 
with some first concluding observations and spell out questions for future research.  
 
2. EP committees: consensual arenas? 
 
From a theoretical point of view and of value for this study, interest in committees is 
based on the belief that parliamentary procedures may affect political outcomes and that 
is therefore desirable to shed light on the organisation and functioning rules of 
legislatures. As Shepsle and Weingast (1994, p. 151) point out, this assumption used not 
to be obvious: ‘features of legislative structure and process as the committee system […] 
figured hardly at all in the first-generation formal models’. Explaining how committees 
operate is the objective of a fructuous literature interested in legislative organisation and 
developed around the U.S. Congress. Over time, three main competing models have been 
                                                 
2 This is based on research conducted with Pierpaolo Settembri, see Settembri and Neuhold (2007). 
3 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on market access to port services 
(COM (2004) 0654 – C6 – 0147/2004/0240 (COD)). 
4 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market 
(COM (2004)0002 – C5-0069/2004 – 2004/0001 (COD)). 
5 From now on these committees will be referred to as the Social Affairs Committee, the Internal Market 
Committee and the Transport Committee, respectively.  
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Weingast and Marshall 1998), members decide the committee to join, which results in 
committees dominated by “high demanders” that generate constituency-specific benefits 
to secure their re-election (Whitaker 2005, p. 6). On the contrary, Cox and McCubbins 
(1993) suggest that committees are instruments of the majority party: as a consequence, 
committee chairs exercise power on behalf of their respective parties (Mattson and Strøm 
1995, p. 255), highly influential positions within committee are pre-dominantly reserved 
to those that vote with the party and also transferral to highly popular committees is done 
according to these criteria. Furthermore the (majority) party is seen to have a firm grip on 
its members when it comes to house rules and as such can gain control of the institution 
itself (Cox and McCubbins 1993, p. 2, 278; McElroy 2001, p. 3). Finally, other scholars 
regard committees, whose members are considered specialised but not necessarily high 
demanders, as efficient generators of information (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989).  
 
As far as the EP committees are concerned, these models have been applied with 
parsimony, if nothing because the EP can hardly be compared to other national 
legislatures and, similarly, the treatment of its committees requires special caution. If, for 
example, one follows Norton (1990, p. 1) in defining Parliaments as ‘constitutionally 
designated institutions for giving assent to binding measures of public policy’, then the 
EP, in many respects, cannot me considered as a Parliament. A fortiori, these caveats 
apply to EP committees. At the same time, however, the committee system is one of the 
most distinctive and developed features of the EP. Following the typology proposed by 
Mattson and Strøm (1995, p. 259), the EP structure comprises samples of all the five 
existing committee variants: there are, for example, cases of (1) ad hoc committees
6, (2) 
law-making committees by function
7, like the committees on constitutional affairs or on 
budgets, (3) specialized committees, which are the vast majority, as well as (4) non-law-
making committees, like the one on petitions. Eventually, since the introduction of the co-
decision procedure, the system also includes an example of a (5) joint committee, namely 
the conciliation committee. 
 
These rapid references suggest two observations: first of all, that committees play a 
central role in the ways in which the EP operates and that more studies in this field are 
                                                 
6 Such as, in the 2004-2009 EP, the temporary committee on policy challenges and budgetary means of the 
enlarged Union 2007-2013.
7 These permanent committees not only prepare legislation, but also additionally differentiate their law-
making functions by preparing, for instance, all legislation of a particular type (such as constitutional law) 
or for one geographical region (Mattson and Strøm 1995: 259).    
  5needed. Second, one has to open the “black box” of EP committees and study more 
carefully how they operate and look at two issues that might in fact be interconnected: 
socialisation into EP committees and consensus formation within EP committees; by 
taking voting behaviour within EP committees as a point of departure. The working 
hypothesis behind this being that a committee with strong espirit de corps might lead to 
more consensual (voting) behaviour. Another working hypothesis that has already guided 
previous research (Neuhold and Settembri 2007) and is put yet again to the test in the 
case studies presented in this paper is that key players within the EP at least facilitate the 
achievement of consensus in committee. 
 
The quality of the answers that can be offered to the ambitious question spelt out above 
depends very much on the quality (and quantity) of empirical evidence one can rely upon. 
Due to the complexity of the phenomena under analysis, the dimensions of parliamentary 
activity to be considered would be numerous. Among others, this work privileges two 
combined approaches. On the one hand, it looks at voting behaviour: this is perhaps the 
most understudied dimension of EP committees, despite the fact that voting behaviour as 
such is very common for the study of legislatures in general (for example, Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997) and voting behaviour in plenary is one of the most developed fields in 
the study of the EP in particular. On the other hand, this paper offers selected qualitative 
evidence to shed lights on the specific mechanisms that determine the process of 
socialisation into EP committees.  
 
Studying voting behaviour in the EP is challenging. Roll call votes - the only votes 
providing information on how each MEP voted - only take place if requested by a 
political group or (currently) 37 MEPs
8 and account, in total, for roughly just one-third of 
EP votes (Hix et al. 2006). Moreover, they cannot be treated as a representative sample of 
the entire population of EP votes because the reality that they picture is biased by the 
reasons underlying their request (Carrubba et al. 2003). When it comes to committees, 
however, the challenge of studying behaviour is even more severe, as there are no roll 
call votes at all. Yet, committees vote on amendments and on the final legislative 
resolution that is sent to the plenary for adoption. Compared to roll call votes in plenary, 
the information provided by committee votes on final texts in committee is certainly 
poorer: records of such votes do not give an indication of the way individual members 
voted (unless, obviously, the vote is unanimous). By revealing the number of “Yes”, 
                                                 
8 Except for a few cases in which a roll call vote is automatic. 
  6“No” and “Abstain”, final votes in committee represent a fair synthesis of alignments on 
a text, describing with a fair degree of approximation the camps of those who supported 
or opposed the outcome.  
 
To exploit this potential, all 945 final legislative reports adopted during the periods July 
1999 – July 2001 and July 2004 – July 2006 have been collected and analysed with 
respect to the number of deputies supporting and opposing each text (or abstaining), the 
procedure applied and the committee primarily responsible.
9  
 
Results on the voting practice in EP committees are quite astonishing: votes in all 
committees and under all procedures are virtually unanimous. The average majorities 
endorsing a text in the first two years of EP5 and EP6 are 94.8% and 95.1%, respectively.  
For the committees under scrutiny the following can be observed: in the Social Affairs 
Committee (during the period of July 1999 and July 2001) 91% of the Members endorsed 
the text at stake and for the period of July 2004 – July 2006 90.5 % voted for the legal 
document in question.  For the Transport Committee we can observe an average of 94,9 
% of MEPs and of 91,0 % endorsing the texts in the periods mentioned above and for the 
Internal Market Committee the majorities were 94.3% and 95.4 % respectively 
(Settembri and Neuhold 2007) 
 
3. Socialisation into EP committees 
 
As this data reflects EP committees seem to generate an amazing capacity to achieve 
consensus. The objective of this paper is however to go beyond these preliminary 
observations, by examining the mechanisms whereby compromises are reached and by 
way of which actor’s preferences are transformed into adopting this consensual stance. 
As one interviewee put it we want to probe into the factors that generate the feeling 
                                                 
9 Were considered as “legislative reports” all texts adopted in the framework of legislative and budgetary 
procedures as well as inter-institutional agreements. A very limited number of these reports (less than 1%) 
could not be used because of missing information. Moreover, when a text was adopted according to a 
simplified procedure, allowing a report to be considered as approved if 1/5 of the committee does not show 
opposition, the agreement was considered as unanimous. Finally, to determine the majority for the adoption 
of each report, Yes votes were counted against No votes. However, although committees decide on the 
basis of the absolute majority of votes cast, in case reports adopted under procedures requiring in plenary 
the support of an absolute majority of members of Parliament, abstentions were considered as No votes.  
For a more detailed overview see: Neuhold and Settembri (2007). 
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10 To 
do so selected case studies are examined as mentioned above. 
 
When examining the research conducted on roles adopted by Members of Parliament in 
general one finds that this endeavour has generated a vast host of literature
11, going back 
to Hagger and Wing, who descriptively mapped out different role concepts among MEPs 
in a European Community of nine Member States and put three different factors to the 
test: the nationality factor, the party factor and the European factor
12. According to this 
study it is the nationality that determines different role concepts  (Hagger and Wing 1979, 
quoted in Blomgren 2002, p. 3f.). Richard Katz also focused on the concept on role 
orientations by mainly examining national variation (for example by focusing on the 
attitudes towards the EU) between a selected number of MEPs  (Katz 1997 and Katz 
1999). 
 
Research focusing on the process of socialisation of MEPs more specifically probed into 
the factors at play that contribute to MEPs adopting a more positive attitude towards 
European integration; probing into the question whether MEPS serving in the chamber 
are turned into “Europeans” ? (Franklin and Scarrow 1999, Scully 2002). In a more 
recent study the impact of social background and institutionalisation of the roles adopted 
by first-time MEPs is scrutinised and this research comes to the preliminary conclusion 
that although these new Members may be ‘first-timers, unschooled virgins they are not’ 
(Bale and Taggart 2006).  
 
Whereas these studies relate to different role concepts adopted by MEPs or to the process 
of socialisation into the EP in general, this paper wants to examine this phenomenon in 
selected committees. In this vein the paper builds on interview data accumulated between 
the period of 2001 and 2007, where it has to be stressed that further interviews are to be 
conducted in the future (see below).
13  
 
 
                                                 
10 Interview with Administrator of the General Secretariat of the EP, 20. April 2007. 
11 A comprehensive overview is given by Blomgren 2002, p. 4. 
12 By way of this factor such elements as the length of service in the EP and commitment to the Community 
were probed into.  
13 Around 30 interviews were conducted in the period of 2001-2002 and further interviews were conducted 
were conducted during the period 2006-2007 (see Neuhold 2002 and Neuhold and Settembri 2007). 
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boundaries of three committees and that can reveal important dynamics as regards to 
socialisation. These cases pertain to legislation negotiated during the legislative period of 
the European Parliament of 2004-2009 (EP6): the Port Services Directive 
14 and the 
Bolkestein Directive
15. These pieces of legislation were selected based on the fact that 
the issues at stake here might seem very controversial at the outset and enabled us to 
study mechanisms that contribute or inhibit consensus formation. 
 
4. “Case studies”: the Port Services Directive and the “Bolkestein” Directive  
 The proposal for the Port Services Directive dates back to February 2001. In essence, the 
consequence of the proposal would have been to open up access to port services. The 
draft caused controversy between trade unions and workers, who were concerned that the 
proposal would open up the sector to under-qualified workers, endangering employment 
among dockworkers and threatening health and safety. The proposal was subject to 
conciliation between EP and Council and although a solution could be found there, the 
EP rejected the conciliated text.
16 A majority of MEPs felt that the implications of the 
directive would lead to degrading the safety conditions in EU docks.  
The Commission then came up with a revised version of a proposal for this directive in 
October 2004 but retained many aspects of its original proposal. The draft then went to 
the committee responsible: the Committee on Transport. It is noteworthy that no 
consensus could be found when voting in committee 22. November 2005: the part of the 
report drafted by the rapporteur Georg Jarzembowski from the European People’s Party 
(PPE-DE) amending the Commission proposal could not secure a majority (European 
Parliament, Legislative Observatory).
17 One has to stress however that in committee a 
sort of compromise was struck as the committee did adopt the draft legislative resolution 
and put the ball in the court of the political groups to table amendments under first 
reading of co-decision. 
 
                                                 
14 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on market access to port services 
(COM (2004) 0654 – C6 – 0147/2004/0240 (COD)). 
15 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market 
(COM (2004)0002 – C5-0069/2004 – 2004/0001 (COD)). 
16 The conciliation committee committee issued a new text on 29 September 2003. This was rejected by 
plenary on 20 November 2003. 
17 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/ 
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MEPs in committee (and beyond) as for him it was "inconceivable reject this directive” 
and he warned that a rejection of the directive would leave a "gap in European 
legislation" and spell "legal uncertainty" for maritime transport 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news).   
 
This is exactly what happened however: Five hundred and twelve MEPs voted on 17. 
January 2006 to reject the Commission's proposal. Only 120 MEPs voted for the adoption 
of the proposal with 25 abstaining. The Socialist (PES), Liberal (ALDE), Green, Left-
wing (GUE/NGL), IND/DEM and UEN groups voted against the proposed directive, and 
not even half of the Conservative PPE/DE group voted in favour of it. The rapporteur 
concluded that “left-wing majority of the house opposed to the directive”. It was a total 
blockade of the left, there was no debate about content.”
18
 
It is interesting that within the Social Affairs Committee, which had to give an opinion on 
this draft directive
19 it seemed much easier than in the committee on Transport and 
Tourism to obtain consensus but in this case against the draft proposal of the 
Commission. Accordingly the draftsman of opinion from the Party of European Socialists 
(PSE) stated “I had an easy job, there was only one individual “who was nervous, but 
even he in the end voted with me. I have been around a long time, people trust my 
judgement. “
20  A very pertinent response for our research which was given to the 
question why consensus could be achieved with ease with the Social Affairs committee is 
the following “we are a self-selected sample, we are the employment team” and have to 
remind ourselves that a healthy majority in committee is not necessarily a healthy 
majority in plenary.” 
21
This answer points in the direction that in some committees such as the Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs there might indeed be something such as an ‘espirit de 
corps’ developing within the committee, i.e. common values and shared views as regards 
the stance to take on certain topics, for example in this case to promote a social affairs 
agenda. On the other hand we also observed the crucial role of the rapporteur or 
draftsperson of opinion, as the case may be, to get support for his or her dossier. This 
                                                 
18 Orginally: „Beim zweiten Versuch den Vorschlag fuer die PSD durchzubringen war eine Mehrheit des 
Hauses dagegen. Es war eine totale Blockade der Linken, es gab keine Sachdebate.“ 
19 From now: Employment Committee.  
20 Interview with MEP, 28. June 2007. 
21 Interview with MEP, 28 June 2007. 
  10seemed not to be case in the Committee on Transport and Tourism, where the rapporteur 
seemed to have alienated committee members. 
The crucial role of rapporteurs in uniting committee members is confirmed by the 
Bolkestein Directive.
22 This Directive on services in the internal market aimed at creating 
a single market for services within the European Union (EU), similar to the single market 
for goods. In this case the committee responsible, the Committee on the Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection (IMCO) could agree on a compromise on several aspects of the 
directive such as the provisions making it easier for a service providing company to 
establish itself in another Member State. The controversiality of the draft legislative act 
was reflected by the fact that 1600 amendments were made in committee. However the 
most contentious issues were not resolved: the country of origin principle
23 and the scope 
of the directive, i.e. which services it would cover precisely. Nevertheless in its amended 
version the report was adopted by a large majority in committee
24 (European Parliament, 
Legislative Observatory).  
It is noteworthy however that the negotiations Bolkenstein directive reflected upon a 
trend that might become even more established in the future: the (least partial) bypassing 
of committees. Rather than trying to achieve a compromise within the committee itself; a 
committee that has been described as “advocating a different stance than the committee 
on employment; where a different ethos is prevalent and there is a division as regards to 
how much liberalisation one can bear”
25 , one circumvented the committee and tried to 
find agreement among the political groups.  
 
The rapporteur of the SPE outlined this process as follows: 
 
“What contributed to success has been a very large number of discussions with the political 
groups, which I met every week. EPP and Greens in particular. The Liberals refused to 
participate, although they were invited. Moreover, I agreed with the EPP that we would not only 
discuss between the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteur (of the EPP) but that we had a group 
of people from each group that would meet regularly, because in each group there were different 
viewpoints and we needed to bring together the different viewpoints of the groups to have a 
comprehensive agreement. I created different meeting places: a) within my group, a working 
groups every Thursday in Strasbourg and a larger horizontal working group within our group to 
bring everybody in. “
26
                                                 
22 This directive is commonly referred to as the Bolkestein Directive due to that fact that it was drafted 
under the leadership of the former Commissioner for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein. 
23  According to the country of origin principle regulations of the country of establishment of the service 
provider would apply and not those of the country in which the service is provided. 
24 25 votes for the amended report to 10, with 5 abstentions. 
25 Interview with MEP, 19.4.2007. 
26 Interview with MEP, 11. July 2006 
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To prepare the vote for plenary an informal forum of negotiation was created. On the 
initiative of the rapporteur and with the approval of their respective group’s leaders, two 
informal negotiating teams of five to six deputies each from the EPP-ED and the PSE 
political groups were formed.
27 These teams, with no legal basis, met on a weekly basis 
in the month preceding the plenary. The vote of the plenary was based on the 
compromise reached within this restricted forum, de facto by-passing the committees. 
  
The Bolkestein Directive as well as the Port Services Directive (even if in this case the 
consensus was found against the rapporteur) reflect the fact that within committees the 
strife for consensus is high. This is a feature that member new to EP committees seem to 
pick up very quickly. This assumption  - which has to be probed into in much more detail 
- that new MEPs become socialised into EP committees and as such change their 
preferences from a more conflictual to a more consensual style is confirmed by one MEP 
as follows: 
 
“Generally we manage to build consensus in committee. One can see that the attitude of new 
members is changing. They learn very quickly that their own opinion is not important, that they 
can not impose their view, but will have to channel it into the majoritarian position. Otherwise 
they will be defeated. But this is not only true for new Member States; even British members 
abandoned their confrontational attitude and changed to consensus builders.”
28
 
Looking at the negotiations in more detail however one finds that within different 
committees different mechanisms were prevalent that give us some first clues for possible 
factors that foster or impede socialisation into EP committees and into adopting a 
consensual stance. 
 
5. First concluding observations and future research agenda 
 
Findings show that committees generally work very consensually, regardless of the issue 
at stake and the procedure applied. The dispersion is minimal and political conflict is 
equally weak. Yet, although in the context of a very consensual political culture, patterns 
of differentiation seem to be emerging across both committees and procedures. On the 
                                                 
27 The composition of these teams seemed to be in the first place determined by the fact whether MEPs 
boasted some policy expertise within the respective field but political  factors also played a role such as 
including a MEP from the country holding the Presidency (Austria) and including a representative from the 
new Member States (Interview with MEP, July 2006). 
28 Interview with MEP, 19.4.2007. 
  12one hand, there is a cleavage - amplified after enlargement - between a group of more 
conflictual and another of more consensual committees.  
 
Both case studies on the Bolkestein and the Port Services Directive reflect the crucial 
roles of rapporteurs or draftsmen of opinion to achieve consensus and get committee 
members on the same track (or to fail to do so as was the case in the Committee on 
Transport). Key players can as such be seen as important (f)actors in the quest to unite or 
disunite committee members, as the case may be, and play an important role into 
socialising members into active members  that are contributing to a “common goal”. 
Moreover we have observed that the need of consensus building is very much entrenched 
within the EP and new MEPs find themselves in a position to sacrifice their own position 
for a viable compromise. 
 
Furthermore we see that in some committees such as the Social Affairs Committee 
general values such as the promotion of a social agenda seem to prevail whereas in the 
Internal Market Committee very different views on the dossier at stake are apparent, 
which in the case of the Bolkestein Directive led to a circumvention of the committee. 
This might be a trend that might become more prevalent in the future; that within an 
enlarged Parliament selected committees - that have been coined in the mid-1990s as 
being the EP’s legislative backbone - are weakened (Westlake 1994). This might 
invariably have an impact on the ‘espirit de corps’ in committees (or the lack thereof 
might indeed lead to their circumvention).  
  
These are all very initial observations and it becomes obvious that more in-depth research 
has to be conducted in order to examine the process of socialisation in committees. Based 
on the pre-liminary research conducted the two most obvious committees to contrast in a 
first stage of the endeavour would be Social Affairs and the Internal Market Committee. 
First observations point in the direction that within the Social Affairs committee an 
espirit de corps might indeed be developing within the Internal Market we see a 
heterogenous committee where MEPs have differing not to say opposing views on the 
degree of market liberalisation admissible.  
 
These differing views on the policies at stake can quite obviously obstruct the attainment 
of consensus and the creation of an ‘espirit de corps’. This question has to be examined 
further and this gives rise to the following sub-questions: 
 
  13•  To what extent is there really an espirit de corps prevalent within the Social 
Affairs Committee and how does this differ according to political groups? And 
more importantly do new members (i.e. those that joined the EP in the most recent 
two rounds of enlargement) sense a pressure to adopt a common position and 
what (if anything) leads them to change their preferences? 
 
•  Is the observation that MEPs advocate different stances as regards to market 
liberalisation within the Internal Market Committee founded, and how does this 
impact on MEPs behaviour? Do new MEPs indeed advocate very different views 
and how can a consensual stance be adopted? 
 
Moreover further research would aim to probe more precisely into the mechanisms of 
socialisation to examine in more detail the role of key players in this process; as the 
negotiations on both Directives shed light on the crucial role of rapporteurs to attain 
consensus. This also implies that one has to dwell more precisely into the role that other 
key players such as group coordinators and committee chairs play within this process of 
socialisation.  
 
These observation should enable us to come to more precise conclusions as regards to the 
factors that have socialising effects on MEPs - and in line with Checkel’s definition - by 
way of which “agent preferences and properties change as result of interaction” 
(Checkel 2003, p. 211).  In order to account for this element of change the process would 
obviously have to be observed over a longer time-span. 
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